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LIBERALISM AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS 
OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
 
Abner S. Greene* 
 
LIBERALISM’S RELIGION.  By Cécile Laborde.  Cambridge and London:  




 Every person reading this review will have pondered, and perhaps 
resolved, his or her religious identity.  Some are devout, and their 
relationship with and faith in God — in a higher power, an extrahuman 
source of generative and normative authority — is of central importance to 
who they are as human beings.  Others are still theists, of a sort, but their 
religiosity is more backgrounded in their everyday lives.  And yet others are 
agnostic — open to theistic belief but not yet convinced — or atheist, and 
denying God’s existence.  In the United States, today, these religious 
differences mostly do not lead to significant conflict.  But because the 
devout, the mildly religious, the agnostic, and the atheist usually coexist in 
where they live and work, some conflict based in religious belief and 
difference is inevitable.  And when the government is involved, such 
conflicts often take on a constitutional dimension.  To what extent may, or 
must, the state acknowledge God’s existence and help theists in their quest 
to have their religious beliefs be central to their existence?  To what extent 
may, or must, the state adjust its laws to help those for whom God’s 
mandates should take precedence?  For both types of question — what we 
under our Constitution sort under the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses of the First Amendment — how do we best preserve the religious 
liberty of those for whom God’s will competes with the state’s and those 
for whom this is not the case, and who might be harmed by state action 
aiding the devout? 
 
 When they arise, the conflicts are front-page news items.  Consider 
these, all cases that ended up at the United States Supreme Court — Should 
the state be permitted to maintain a forty foot Latin cross at a public 
highway intersection?1  Should the state be permitted to use taxpayer dollars 
                                                 
* Leonard F. Manning Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.  I dedicate this Review in 
loving memory of my dear friend John Nagle, from whom I learned so much about religious 
devotion.  For helpful written feedback on this essay, I thank Aditi Bagchi, Jim Brudney, 
Clare Huntington, Cécile Laborde, Russ Pearce, Micah Schwartzman, and Olivier Sylvain.  
And I am very grateful to all my Fordham Law colleagues who participated in a Zoom 
virtual workshop on this essay during the novel coronavirus crisis. 
1 American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577729
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to fund private secular but not religious schools?2  Must the state exempt, 
from public accommodations anti-discrimination law, a devoutly Christian 
baker who won’t make a custom cake for a same-sex wedding celebration?3  
Must the state permit religious employers to opt out of providing the portion 
of group health insurance that includes contraception, because the employer 
deems the contraception an abortifacient?4 
 
 Constitutional and statutory jurisprudence in the United States has 
sought a middle ground between permitting the state to achieve secular, 
sometimes liberal (as in ‘left of center’) political ends, and ensuring robust 
religious liberty.  In Liberalism’s Religion, a work of political theory with 
important intersections with U.S. law and religion jurisprudence, Cécile 
Laborde confronts the establishment and free exercise dilemmas that arise 
in a religiously heterogeneous liberal democracy.  She offers a middle 
ground solution, permitting a small swath for state acknowledgment of 
religion and requiring a somewhat larger space for state exemptions for 
religion from generally applicable law.  But she does this with barely a 
mention of God or theism.  This is because, for Laborde, the solution to the 
dilemmas a religiously integrated liberal democracy face is, strikingly, to 
drop religion out of the picture.  I exaggerate, but only a bit.  Laborde’s 
thesis is that “we should disaggregate religion into a plurality of different 
interpretive dimensions” (p. 2); she claims that “religion is not uniquely 
special:  whatever treatment it receives from the law, it receives in virtue of 
features that it shares with nonreligious beliefs, conceptions, and identities.”  
(p. 3)  She casts her lot with scholars such as Chris Eisgruber, Larry Sager, 
Micah Schwartzman, and Nelson Tebbe, describing her approach as “liberal 
egalitarianism.”5  (p. 4; hereinafter “LE”)  Thus, on the nonestablishment 
side of things, the state should (for the most part) not endorse or establish 
religion, but “only because it does not establish or endorse any conception 
of the good in general.”  (p. 5)  For example, Laborde contends, “[a] state 
that enforces a secular comprehensive conception of the good — Rawls’s 
favorite example was a philosophy of Kantian autonomy, but we could think 
of other comprehensive world-views, such as ecocentrism — would fall 
afoul of liberal legitimacy on exactly the same ground as would a 
comprehensively religious state.”  (p. 145)  And on the free exercise side of 
things, the state should (sometimes) protect religion, but “only as one of the 
ways in which citizens live a life they think good.”  (p. 5)  For example, 
Laborde says the following situations that might give rise to exemption 
                                                 
2 Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P. 3d 603 (2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 
2777 (U.S. June 28, 2019) (No. 18-1195). 
3 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
4 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
5See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER AND LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (2007); NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 
(2017); Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 
(2012). 
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claims should at least get to a balancing of individual versus state interest 
(and not be excluded at the get-go), whether based in religion or other deep 
commitments:  “[a] parent sincerely believes that strict discipline — 
including justly administered mild corporal punishment — serves the moral 
edification of her child”;; “[a] bakery owner … does not mind serving a gay 
customer but objects to writing a pro-same-sex marriage slogan on the cake 
that the customer wishes to purchase.”  (p. 211)  In addition to casting her 
lot with the LEs, Laborde describes a separate group of scholars, such as 
Stanley Fish and Steven Smith, as “critical religion theorists,” (p. 14) 
focusing on their claims that there is no stable, neutral governmental 
approach that does not involve the state staking its own positions on matters 
of religion.6 
 
 But Liberalism’s Religion devotes almost no space to an important third 
position, which contends that religious belief and practice are distinctive 
and deserving of distinctive legal treatment.  This “religion as distinctive” 
camp — of which I am a member7 — begins with recognizing that for many 
religious people, God exists and their faith in and relationship to God is 
front and center in their lives.  For many religious people, belief in God and 
what follows from that is not comparable to anything, and cannot properly 
be disaggregated into just another set of beliefs and practices.  For the most 
devout religious people, God’s being extrahuman is at the core of their lives 
and their devotion.  How can law take seriously that beliefs and practices 
not based in commonly shared material-scientific fact animate the lives of 
many of our fellow citizens?8 
                                                 
6 See Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible:  Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and 
State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997); Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk:  The 
Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869 (2009). 
7 See Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION:  A 
CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Abner S. Greene, The Political 
Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993).  For other writings supporting 
religion as distinctive, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
NEUTRALITY (2013); Thomas C. Berg, Can Religious Liberty Be Protected as Equality?, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1211-15 (2007); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 
J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 313, 316-19 (1996); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and 
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001-06 (1990); 
Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 
(2000); Mark Storslee, On Religion’s Specialness, 81 REVIEW OF POLITICS 656, 661 (2019) 
(responding to Laborde’s disaggregation argument; “When it comes to religion, the whole 
is more than the sum of its parts.  And indeed, that might just be what makes it special”). 
8 See Abner S. Greene, Religion and Theistic Faith:  On Koppelman, Leiter, Secular 
Purpose, and Accommodations, 49 TULSA L. REV. 441 (2013).  One of the issues debated 
in law and religion scholarship is how to define religion, and whether belief in God is 
necessary to such definition.  I have focused on belief in God — on an extrahuman source 
of normative authority — as typical and at the core of the law and religion debates in the 
U.S.  Sometimes theory should be able to focus on typical examples, rather than necessary 
features, of the matter under discussion.  See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 
35-41 (2015) (defending his focus on law’s coercive nature, even though aspects of law are 
not coercive). 
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 One goal in this review is to examine whether Laborde’s LE is a 
defensible approach to the role of religion in the liberal state.  At the same 
time, I will examine how well her approach fits with the U.S. constitutional 
settlement regarding law and religion.  Although her book is not meant to 
be primarily an analysis of U.S. law, Laborde relies on the work of 
important U.S. constitutional scholars, who are seeking both a political 
theoretic and constitutional answer to questions of nonestablishment and 
free exercise.  I will claim that a different kind of egalitarianism is the better 
answer from both political theory and constitutional law:  an egalitarianism 
that does not disaggregate religion and approach it similarly to other beliefs 
and practices, but rather that takes seriously religion’s distinctiveness — its 
basis in one’s relationship to God — and thus that treats religious people 
and institutions as fully equal participants in our liberal democratic project.  
I will also challenge a predicate to Laborde’s argument, that the sovereign 
state in a liberal democracy has legitimate authority to draw jurisdictional 
lines between church and state and thus justifiably resolve the difficult 
establishment and free exercise issues that arise.  My objection to Laborde 
on this question of authority isn’t that the state has no role in drawing 
church-state lines, and isn’t that the state is never justified in so doing; 
rather, my position is that there is no general argument that backs the state 
in applying all laws to all persons and institutions.  We should see questions 
of political obligation (is there a moral duty to obey the law?) and political 
legitimacy (is the state justified in demanding our legal obedience?) as 
correlative; we should appreciate that there is no valid, general, affirmative 
answer to these questions; and thus, the state must earn its stripes, as it were, 
law by law or case by case.  This understanding of political obligation and 
legitimacy undergirds one way of arguing for exemptions.9 
 
 Part I of this review will describe Laborde’s argument.  Part II will offer 
two critiques of her position — that she is defending the wrong kind of 
egalitarianism for the religion and state settlement we have reached in the 
U.S. and that would be best for any liberal democracy; and that her 
“jurisdictional” argument backing the wholesale legitimacy of the liberal 
state’s role in policing the religion-state settlement cannot be properly 
sustained. 
 
I.  LABORDE’S CASE 
 
 Part I of Liberalism’s Religion (“Analogizing Religion”) begins with a 
chapter containing LE’s response to three challenges offered by the critical 
religion theorists.  These challenges are (a) semantic — that liberalism has 
not offered a “stable, universally valid empirical referent for the category of 
religion,” (p. 18) (b) protestant — that “liberal law is biased toward 
                                                 
9 See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION:  THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY 
IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012). 
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individualistic, belief-based religions,” (p. 21) and (c) realist — that the 
liberal state’s treatment of religion is either “the naked exercise of arbitrary 
power” (p. 24) and/or that it establishes liberalism as a kind of religion.  
Laborde’s answer to the semantic challenge is centered in the anti-religious-
distinctiveness position taken by the LEs:  The state may sometimes protect 
religious belief and practice, but only because of qualities shared by secular 
belief and practice; therefore, the LE needn’t get embroiled in difficult 
questions of defining what is and isn’t “religion.”  Her answer to the 
protestant challenge is to reject the critical religion theorists’ premise:  In a 
properly functioning liberal democracy, majoritarian power and prejudice 
isn’t reducible to a bias favoring “belief-based, voluntarily chosen religious 
practices” (p. 33); rather, law protects a “right not to be coerced into 
changing or abandoning the beliefs or way of life that one in fact has,” 
including both those who “choose” and those who are “called.” (p. 34)  As 
for the realist challenge, Laborde makes the easy point that there are 
defensible and indefensible exercises of state power.  Of greater importance 
and connection to her LE position, Laborde claims that LE “is not … 
grounded in any comprehensive metaphysical, ontological, or ethical 
doctrine.”  (p. 40)  Thus, although there’s no such thing as the state 
governing in a value-free way, the critical religion theorists are wrong in 
thinking the liberal state is establishing an official religion of secularism (or 
anything else); rather, “liberalism is based on the idea that all individuals 
should enjoy as much freedom as is compatible with the freedoms of 
others.”  (p. 38)  This follows from Laborde’s discussion of classic Millian 
harm theory, and is not meant to prefer the autonomous life over other ways 
of life. 
 
 The next two chapters of Part I describe possible approaches to what in 
constitutional law we would call free exercise exemptions issues and 
establishment clause issues.  Laborde sets forth approaches from different 
liberal theorists, with some support and some critique for each, all from her 
LE perspective (which she then cashes out with an affirmative case in Part 
II).  Chapter 2 is about exemptions.  Laborde begins with a description and 
critique of what she calls “dissolving religion” (p. 44), focusing on Ronald 
Dworkin’s take on exemptions in his final work, Religion Without God.10  
On the one hand, Dworkin claims freedom of religion is a general and not 
special right.  This means we shouldn’t apply elevated scrutiny to protect it; 
rather, the state “must not appeal to the superiority of any way of life over 
another,” (p. 45) religious or otherwise.  In this way, freedom of religion is 
“an instantiation of a more general right of ethical independence,” (p. 46) 
and is an example of appropriate limits on the state’s reasons for action.  
Carried to its extreme, this focus on the government’s reasons and not on 
possible disparate impact looks like Brian Barry’s no-holds-barred 
approach:  If the state has defensible reasons for a law of general 
                                                 
10 RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013). 
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applicability, then there’s not a good case for exemptions.11  But, as Laborde 
shows, Dworkin was in fact concerned with laws that disparately affect 
what a group might regard as “sacred” (p. 50) — although for Dworkin this 
may be theistic or not theistic.  This expanded view of the sacred as religious 
leads to a potentially expansive view of exemptions and to a view that 
forbids laws from being justified on grounds that take positions on what 
counts as sacred.  This in turn requires some understanding of religious 
distinctiveness, even if not limited to a God-centered understanding. 
 
 Laborde turns next to a view she dubs “mainstreaming religion,” (p. 50) 
covering a position advanced by Eisgruber and Sager, which would protect 
religious interests comparably to similarly serious nonreligious interests, 
against intentional or unintentional state discrimination against 
vulnerable/minority groups.12  Exemptions are sometimes warranted, but 
not because of anything distinctive about religious belief.  In the U.S. 
constitutional law community, Eisgruber and Sager are leaders in the 
‘religion as non-distinctive’ school; they are LEs, so Laborde’s critiques are 
internal to LEs.  Her main point is that Eisgruber and Sager “have not settled 
for a single criterion of comparability between religion and nonreligion and 
instead oscillate between normatively distinct criteria.”  (p. 54)  One 
criterion is “vulnerability to discrimination,” (p. 54) about which Laborde 
is mostly in agreement; the problem, though, is figuring out which 
nonreligious commitments are ethically salient in the way religious 
commitments are, so we can then analogize among vulnerable groups and 
take steps toward awarding exemptions.  One comparator is “depth of 
commitments,” (p. 55) and although Laborde has some sympathy with this, 
she suggests we might sometimes want to protect a deeply held religious 
interest that has no obvious nonreligious analogy.  Finally, Laborde 
evaluates Eisgruber and Sager’s focus on “close association” (p. 58) to 
sometimes permit exemptions for groups; here, too, Laborde’s LE approach 
is mostly sympathetic (e.g., a nonreligious as well as religious group should 
be able to choose its leaders regardless of a law of general applicability that 
would cover the normal business world); one critique she offers is that 
religious institutions sometimes might not properly qualify as truly close 
associations (as, say, a family or small club would). 
 
 The third approach to exemptions that Laborde discusses (and that she 
calls “narrowing religion” (p. 61)) is offered by Jocelyn Maclure and 
Charles Taylor, in their book Secularism and Freedom of Conscience.13  
Another LE offering, this book’s case for exemptions would cover “moral 
                                                 
11  See BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY:  AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF 
MULTICULTURALISM (2001).  For my response, see Abner S. Greene, Three Theories of 
Religious Equality ... and of Exemptions, 87 TEX. L. REV. 963 (2009). 
12 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 5. 
13  JOCELYN MACLURE AND CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF 
CONSCIENCE (2011). 
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beliefs [that] structure moral identity,” (p. 62) religious or nonreligious.  
Although Laborde applauds Maclure and Taylor’s taking our ethical 
pluralism seriously, she finds their focus on “categoricity” (p. 63) — on 
whether the claim is based on an unalterable call of conscience — too 
narrow.  We might find religious practices of significance to a claimant’s 
“moral integrity” (p. 66), without necessarily being duties of conscience. 
 
 Chapter 3 of Liberalism’s Religion turns to the “state neutrality puzzle,” 
(p. 69) which in U.S. constitutional law is establishment clause territory.  
Laborde once again gives us theories from Dworkin and Eisgruber/Sager; 
the third effort here comes from Jonathan Quong.  All, again, are mostly 
fellow travelers with Laborde; she is offering and tweaking versions of LE, 
setting up her own case.  Laborde reminds us of Dworkin’s core argument 
for “ethical independence” (p. 70); the state should be neutral about matters 
of religion as it should be neutral about “the good in general.”  (p. 71)  
Dworkin is careful to limit this claim to the state’s not using reasons based 
in foundational views of the good life to regulate matters of personal ethics, 
such as religion, family, and sexuality.  Thus, “ethical independence does 
not demand neutrality toward other kinds of goods — the good of culture, 
the arts, or the environment, for example — because they do not fall within 
[the] domain of personal ethics.”  (p. 76)  But as in much of the other liberal 
theory Laborde critiques, there’s a boundary problem; here the difficulty is 
in drawing the line between when the state should be hands off because a 
matter is one of “personal” (p. 80) ethics and when the matter at hand might 
affect social justice and possibly harm to others.  (As always, the core 
Millian notion of liberty until harm is caused requires a theory of harm that 
may be sharply contested.)  Laborde concludes that “Dworkinian liberalism 
relies on a more substantive view of the liberal good than he 
acknowledged.”  (p. 82) 
 
 On the nonestablishment side of things, Eisgruber and Sager’s concern 
with vulnerable persons or groups — defined by religion or otherwise — 
leads to a fairly capacious limit on state speech, which Laborde dubs “civic 
disparagement.”  (p. 82)  Not only do they adopt a fairly mainstream view 
about the state not endorsing a favored religion; they also contend the state 
may not use its expressive powers in a way that would disparage persons 
based on race or other vulnerable/minority characteristics.  Laborde is 
sympathetic to this ‘religion as not distinctive’ position, for theory and law.  
She reminds us that it can sometimes be hard to tell, in the setting of public 
education (one arena for state expression), whether the state is teaching a 
controverted and potentially caste-creating view as true versus teaching 
about different positions in a complex area.  She also notes that merely 
because a matter is divisive or controversial doesn’t mean the state’s taking 
a position is improper — Eisgruber and Sager’s concern with which she 
agrees is about state endorsement of favored positions on religion, race, and 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577729
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the like, that doubles as state disparagement (sometimes clearly so, 
sometimes more implicitly so) on these same grounds. 
 
 The third scholar whose views Laborde discusses as relevant to 
establishment clause issues is Jonathan Quong, and his book Liberalism 
Without Perfection.14  Quong’s limit on state justifications for lawmaking 
is based in what Laborde dubs a theory of “foundational disagreement,” (p. 
92) and it requires distinguishing disagreements about the good from 
disagreements about the just.  For Quong, the former are foundational and 
appeal to “no premise that all citizens can reasonably expect to share.”  (p. 
93)  He contends, though, that disagreements about the just are not 
foundational, but rely on properly public debatable and resolvable positions.  
(Note that Quong’s is an anti-religious-distinctiveness position; although it 
might include a case against laws primarily backed by religious 
justification, his is a broader Rawlsian public reason position.)  Laborde’s 
key intervention is to claim that the boundary between the realms of the just 
and the good is often complex, “often requires drawing on contested ideas 
about the good,” (p. 104) and that “liberal neutrality lacks the resources to 
solve the boundary problem.”  (p. 107)15  One might think this is a victory 
for the critical religion theorists, but later in the book Laborde resists this, 
defending the state’s legitimate authority to determine where justice reigns 
and thus the state may and must appropriately rule. 
 
 In Part II, Laborde develops her case for “disaggregating religion,” at 
each turn reducing religion to aspects of religious belief and practice that 
have secular analogues.  In so doing, Laborde shows that different 
dimensions of religion (and their secular analogues) map onto different 
dimensions of “minimal secularism” (p. 116) (for the Establishment Clause 
type issues) and of “justice” (p. 197) (for the Free Exercise Clause type 
issues).  Chapter 4 disaggregates religion for nonestablishment issues; 
Laborde defends what she dubs “minimal secularism.”  (p. 113)  Drawing 
in part on her Chapter 3 discussion of Dworkin, Eisgruber and Sager, and 
Quong (and with references to John Rawls at key points), Laborde develops 
three necessary principles of minimal liberal secularism.  These principles 
are about accessible reasons backing law (“the justifiable state” (p. 117)), 
the state refraining from disparaging vulnerable groups (“the inclusive 
state” (p. 132)), and law not being based on comprehensive ethics/views of 
the good (“the limited state” (p. 143)).  For each principle, religion serves 
as just an example of how the state might err.  So, for the justifiable state, 
following Rawls’ public reason theory, Laborde claims that “state-proffered 
reasons for laws must be articulated in a language that members of the 
                                                 
14 JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION (2011). 
15 For Quong’s response, see Jonathan Quong, On Laborde’s Liberalism, CRIM. L. & PHIL. 
(published on-line 5/13/19) (“All areas of social life are justice-apt”;; “disagreements 
between reasonable citizens about the political status of certain creatures can be resolved 
by appeal to the justificatory framework shared by all such citizens”). 
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public can understand and engage with.”  (p. 119)  Accessible reasons are 
the “currency of democratic debate.”  (p. 122)  Religious reasons are not 
always inaccessible in this way; and sometimes nonreligious reasons can 
flunk the inaccessibility test (Laborde cites personal experience as an 
example).  Next, for the inclusive state, tracking Eisgruber and Sager, 
Laborde claims that “[w]hen a social identity is a marker of vulnerability 
and discrimination, it should not be symbolically endorsed and promoted 
by the state.”  (p. 137)  Here, too, religion is just one example of how the 
state might fail to adhere to this principle; and just as not all religious 
reasons are inaccessible, so too not all state religious speech is 
impermissibly disparaging.  Finally, for the limited state, Laborde relies on 
a Rawlsian principle (previewed in the earlier discussion of Quong’s work), 
claiming that “[w]hen a practice relates to comprehensive ethics [otherwise 
described as “comprehensive conception[s] of the good” (p. 145)], it should 
not be coercively enforced on individuals.”  (p. 144)  This may cover 
nonreligious as well as religious doctrines; and when either religion or 
nonreligion is used in a noncomprehensive way, it is permissible.  So, to 
summarize what Laborde is up to in Chapter 4:  The state must turn square 
corners on all three metrics — laws must be based in accessible reasons; the 
state should not speak in a way that disparages vulnerable groups; and laws 
may not be based in comprehensive views of the good.  State action 
regarding religious or secular beliefs and practices is problematic if it flunks 
any of the three metrics; if it satisfies all three criteria, then it is not 
problematic. 
 
 In Chapter 5, Laborde again treats religion as non-distinctive in 
developing a theory of freedom of association (for groups).  Actually that’s 
the second part of chapter 5; the first part is an important and to some extent 
stand-alone argument — it’s Laborde’s predicate for the whole book, where 
she defends the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state’s authority to be 
deciding issues of law and religion in the first place.  I’ll return to that after 
describing the freedom of association argument and the exemptions 
argument from chapter 6.  To gain presumptive freedom of association a 
group must be voluntary (members may leave “at no excessive cost” (p. 
174)) and identificatory  (“individuals join to pursue a conception of the 
good that is central to their identity and integrity” (p. 174)).  With these 
preliminaries in place, Laborde claims that groups — religious or 
nonreligious — may have either “coherence interests” or “competence 
interests” (p. 175).  The former tracks what in U.S. constitutional law is a 
right of expressive association — to form a group to advance particular 
messages or interests, and thus to exclude those who don’t share that 
common purpose.  Laborde sets forth some conditions for groups to claim 
freedom of association in this way — their professed doctrine must clearly 
be restrictive regarding membership; there should be formal organization; 
and there should be individual freedom to enter and exit.  When a group 
meets these criteria, “full exemptions from law of general application” (p. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577729
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175) are warranted.  The key issues here are selection and exclusion of 
leaders and members.  Competence interests are a bit trickier to grasp.  
Laborde says they “refer to associations’ special expertise in the 
interpretation and application of [a group’s professed] standards, purposes, 
and commitments.”  (p. 190-91)  In such settings — again, religious or 
otherwise — courts must exhibit sufficient deference to the group’s 
expertise and ability to answer what we might think of as internal questions 
(e.g., a question of religious truth or a question of who deserves tenure or 
promotion). 
 
 Laborde bases her theory of non-religion-distinctive exemptions, in 
Chapter 6, on the notion of integrity.  “Integrity is an ideal of congruence 
between one’s ethical commitments and one’s actions.”  (p. 203)  It is about 
“the values of identity, autonomy, moral agency, and self-respect.”  (p. 204)  
Based on this conception, Laborde contends that the state has reason to 
exempt “integrity-protecting commitments,” (p. 203) (IPCs) of which there 
are two varieties — “obligation IPCs,” (p. 215) which need not be 
connected to a narrow view of conscience (they can be, e.g., based in 
“[c]ultural or communal practices”), and “identity IPCs,” which are “non-
obligation-imposing commitments and practices that comprehensively 
regulate the lives of the claimant.”  (p. 216)  Laborde then develops the 
following architecture for courts to consider exemptions claims:  Judges 
may examine a claimant’s sincerity; the practice claimed for an exemption 
must be nontrivial, important; “morally abhorrent claims” (p. 207) should 
be rejected at the get-go; “morally ambivalent claims” (p. 209) can pass step 
one and get to a balancing test at step two.16  In general, exemptions claims 
                                                 
16 A few commentators on Laborde’s book have taken her to task for allowing too many 
claims into the “morally ambivalent” category and thus subject to a balancing test.  See 
Alan Patten, Religious Accommodation and Disproportionate Burden, CRIM. L. & PHIL.  
(published on-line 1/4/20) (“a person has a pro tanto claim on others only for a fair 
opportunity to pursue and fulfill her integrity-protecting commitments.  There is no pro 
tanto claim to realize integrity-protecting commitments that either by their very nature are 
inconsistent with the fair claims of others, or that for contingent reasons (resource scarcity, 
etc.) are incompatible with the fair claims of others”);; Lori Watson, Integrity:  An 
Individual or Social Virtue?, 81 REVIEW OF POLITICS 652, 654-55 (2019) (“claims for 
refusing to recognize or act on the basis of laws that demand equal recognition for others 
will not ground an integrity objection”).  But as Laborde has said in response to some 
commentators, hers is a modest liberalism that is a “substantive commitment that takes 
seriously pluralism and the burdens of judgment.”  Cécile Laborde, Reply:  Disagreement, 
Equal Respect, and the Boundaries of Liberalism, 81 REVIEW OF POLITICS 665, 666 (2019).  
She adds (responding to Watson) that the disagreement between relational egalitarians and 
orthodox political liberals is a “reasonable disagreement about liberal justice,” and that 
sometimes granting exemptions is one way to recognize this disagreement.  Id. at 667. 
 I would go further than Laborde and suggest that an exemptions regime should be and, 
in fact, always is, a balancing test.  When we exclude certain claims supposedly up front, 
as “morally abhorrent,” we are implicitly doing a kind of balancing — it’s just that the case 
is so heavily tilted toward denying the exemption that it looks as though we’ve done 
something at step one without reaching a step two balancing test.  Here, as in free speech 
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are tricky because they represent a conflict between the state’s view of the 
good and the claimant’s/group’s view.  In a properly functioning liberal 
democracy, we might want people to take responsibility for their beliefs 
(and obey the law or risk the sanction), but “only if background 
circumstances are fair.”  (p. 220)  Laborde then develops two methods for 
determining when such circumstances may be sufficiently unfair as to 
warrant an exemption — “disproportionate burden” (p. 221), which mostly 
covers obligation IPCs, and “majority bias,” (p. 229), which mostly covers 
identity IPCs. 
 
 Judges applying Laborde’s disproportionate burden test would examine 
several factors:  “directness” of the burden (p. 221), “severity” of the burden 
(p. 222), proportionality of the burden considering the aim of the law (p. 
225), and whether the exemption can be awarded without excessive cost-
shifting (p. 227).  “[E]xemptions are compatible with justice if the balance 
of these four reasons renders the burden [on the claimant] disproportionate.”  
(p. 228)  The majority bias test focuses on situations in which the majority 
protects its own interests but fails to similarly protect minorities (of various 
sorts).  A key concern is if such bias affects “[c]ore societal opportunities 
[such as] access to primary goods, work, and education.”  (p. 231) 
 
 Finally, I turn to Laborde’s treatment of “state sovereignty and religious 
institutionalism.”  (p. 161)  This is a predicate for the rest of her LE 
argument, as it purports to ground the state’s role in resolving difficult 
questions of establishment and free exercise.  Earlier in the book, Laborde 
suggests that one of the challenges to LE posed by the critical religion 
theorists is that of “jurisdictional boundary,” (p. 5) and she agrees that 
“liberals must think harder about the ultimate sovereignty of the state and 
its legitimacy in enforcing specific terms of liberal justice.”  (p. 6)  In 
Chapter 5, Laborde rejects this challenge with a ringing endorsement of the 
legitimacy of the liberal democratic state in using coercive power to resolve 
various boundary questions and then the difficult as-applied questions that 
arise in the day to day operations of the state.  We need, says Laborde, a 
“final, ultimate source of sovereignty” (p. 161) to resolve various conflicts.  
The state has liberal legitimacy for this task if it “pursues a recognizably 
liberal conception of justice, and does so democratically.”  (p. 168)  It is the 
“only institution with the legitimacy to [resolve matters on which there is 
reasonable disagreement], because it can reliably enforce a scheme of 
cooperation over time, and because it represents the interests of citizens as 
citizens.”  (p. 168)  Thus, the state has the legitimate “competence to 
                                                 
law, it’s better not to bury any of the normative work we’re doing.  Rather, in both settings, 
we should acknowledge a wide array of claims for religious freedom or freedom of speech, 
and then realize that some of these claims are quite weak, either on their own merits, or 
because of strong countervailing state interests, or both.  For more on this in the free speech 
setting, see Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. 
L. REV. 1475, 1508-11 (2018). 
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adjudicate jurisdictional boundary questions,” (p. 162) including proper 
lines of church/state, religious/secular, political/personal, and 
public/private.  Laborde’s is a familiar argument for the legitimacy of a 
liberal state’s coercive power, focusing on such a state’s democratic 
underpinning and the systemic need for settlement. 
 
II.  TWO CRITIQUES OF LABORDE’S CASE 
 
A.  An Opposing View — Religion as Distinctive 
 
 Liberalism’s Religion focuses on the liberal egalitarian position — both 
Laborde’s and other scholars whose related views she connects to her own.  
She briefly describes a “separationist approach” (p. 29) that sees religion as 
special, but spends little time on it.  In Part II.A.1, I will attempt to fill that 
gap, presenting a normative and doctrinal case for religion as distinctive in 
a liberal democratic state, specifically in the setting of the U.S. Constitution.  
In Part II.A.2, I will show where Laborde’s “disaggregating” approach fails 
to fit with the religion-as-distinctive approach, while agreeing with her at 
times that it is appropriate to fold aspects of religion into larger categories. 
 
1.  The case for seeing religion as distinctive 
 
 At least for the U.S. Constitution, and more broadly for any liberal 
democratic state, we should see religious belief and practice as distinctive 
in certain ways.  Most issues of religious freedom in the U.S. — under both 
religion clauses — are connected to theistic belief, to belief in an 
extrahuman source of normative authority (and sometimes generative 
power).  Several important religion law scholars over the last generation 
have developed a Laborde-like LE approach, deflecting from the central 
role faith in God plays in the lives of devout religious people, instead 
folding religion into larger categories of belief and practice, thus 
backgrounding the fact that the First Amendment makes religion the subject 
of nonestablishment and free exercise norms.17  These approaches do not 
take seriously enough that for devout religious people, God’s commands are 
primary.  Even if such people are not theocrats, and acknowledge that God’s 
commands will sometimes have to yield to those of the state, nonetheless 
they deem the call from an extrahuman source of normative authority to be 
distinctive.  Belief in God, for devout religious people, is not comparable to 
anything.18 
 
 The liberal democratic state was borne in part from a desire to have a 
secular rather than theistic grounding for government.  Along with this came 
                                                 
17 See supra note 5. 
18 For my challenge to several scholars who critique a God-centered view of religious 
freedom, see Greene, supra note 8 (discussing works by Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, 
Sam Harris, and Brian Leiter). 
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strong arguments for broad toleration of religious faiths.  This is a 
commendable version of political pluralism, accepting the various sources 
of the good and authority to which many of our fellow citizens adhere.  
Although later in this review essay I summarize a non-religion-distinctive 
version of political pluralism in a liberal democracy, there is a case for 
focusing specially on theistic belief.  Reliance on an extrahuman source of 
normative authority is not like relying on intrahuman theories of the good; 
often, a sectarian theistic view will appeal and speak to, and only be 
accessible to, those who share the relevant religious faith.  “What is 
inaccessible to nonbelievers … is … the relationship between the human 
believer and the extrahuman source of authority.” 19   There is, thus, a 
distinctive reason to keep the state out of advancing or endorsing sectarian 
theistic norms, in various aspects of statecraft (including, as I will canvass 
further below, in the lawmaking process, public schools, and state speech).  
There is similarly distinctive reason to allow out from under the grips of 
otherwise valid, general law, our fellow citizens who pledge allegiance to 
such an extrahuman source of normative authority (with appropriate 
consideration for the good advanced by uniform application of such law). 
 
 A question for liberal political theory that overlaps with a question for 
domestic constitutional theory is what kind of legal nonestablishment and 
free exercise rules should apply if we are appropriately agnostic, as a matter 
of political/constitutional theory, on the question whether God exists.  If we 
take liberalism to be a departure from state-sponsored religion, and based 
in a broad (though not unlimited) toleration of various religious beliefs and 
practices, then political agnosticism on the God question is the right fit.  
Were we to bake either theism or atheism into constitutional and other legal 
rules, we would improperly take positions on a question that not only 
divides people in a deep way, but also that is arguably the key question on 
which the modern liberal state has developed to avoid taking a firm position.  
Furthermore, one of the beauties of the U.S. constitutional system — 
regarding both structure and rights — is that it is agnostic at its core, in the 
following sense:20  In devising both separation of powers and federalism, 
the framers were primarily concerned with avoiding concentration of power 
in any one branch or person or seat of government.  This is a kind of 
                                                 
19 Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special?  A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 535, 538.  Laws based in natural and social science are not similarly inaccessible to 
nonbelievers.  “[E]ven if science … is based — as religion is — in an important way on 
faith (nondeducible premises), the critical difference is that by its own terms, science points 
to the human and natural world for the source of value, whereas religion, by its own terms, 
points not only to the human and natural world, but also outward to an extrahuman realm.”  
Id. at 540. 
20 For elaboration on this “multiple repositories of power” theory, see Abner S. Greene, 
Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 477 (2000); Abner 
S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1996); 
Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 123 (1994). 
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structural agnosticism, making it hard for any answer to be firmly deemed 
correct, at least not without clearing difficult hurdles and not without 
opportunity for challenge and revision.  And our core political rights — of 
speech, press, assembly, petition, and voting — are best understood as 
offering citizens robust opportunities to challenge the status quo.  My claim 
is that liberal theory and constitutional law back an open-ended political 
agnosticism on the question whether God exists.  To that end, U.S. 
constitutional doctrine has often reached a workable resolution by 
appreciating the special role God plays in the lives of the devoutly religious, 
while keeping the state out of advancing specific religious positions. 
 
 Here’s how the religion as distinctive position has played out at the 
Supreme Court, from its apex with Justice Brennan as the key figure, to 
some decline since.  Let’s start with the Establishment Clause, and examine 
four types of problem.  First, consider the understanding that law should not 
be based in express, predominant, religious justification.  This norm applies 
to legislatures, not citizens.  One way of understanding this is as a political 
process point — reliance on an extrahuman source of normative authority, 
in whom only some of our citizens (and legislators) believe, cuts out others 
from meaningful access to the basis of the resulting general, binding law.21  
The Court has invalidated state action on this “religious purpose” test in 
Epperson, Wallace, Edwards, Santa Fe, and McCreary.22  Although some 
scholars and Justices have questioned it — primarily proposing an 
alternative test that would uphold any law with a plausible secular 
justification, regardless of an actual express, predominant, religious 
justification — this line of cases has held fast.  They are a prime example 
of the religion as distinctive position, for there is no comparable norm 
against laws based in express, predominant, secular justification. 
 
 Second, in the public school system, the state may not teach religious 
doctrine, and its teachers and other officials may not lead students in 
religious prayer (even if students may formally opt out).23  That religion is 
distinctive for both points should be apparent — the state teaches secular 
doctrine as true all the time (various views on U.S. history, science, etc.); 
                                                 
21 Which is not to deny the deep influence of religion and religious ideas on secular law.  
For a recent thoughtful exposition of this, see Jeremy Waldron, Religion’s Liberalism, 
CRIMINAL L. & PHIL. (forthcoming on-line 2020) (religious ideas that “can be discerned in 
liberalism’s abstract philosophical positions” include the sacredness of the person, human 
dignity, free will, personal responsibility, equality, respect for ordinary people, rights, and 
social justice). 
22 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 
530 U.S. 290 (2000); Edwards v. Aguillard, 472 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
23 Epperson, id. at 106-07, and Edwards, id. at 589-94, are clear on the former; Abington 
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), 
on the latter. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3577729
 15 
and teachers and other officials may lead students in nonreligious recitation 
(even if students may formally opt out).24 
 
 Third, the cases involving public funding of private, religious schools 
are complex in terms of whether religion is treated as distinctive.  The core 
line of Establishment Clause cases now permits state funding (through 
various mechanisms) that benefits private religious schooling, so long as 
such funding is general (it’s not just for such schools) and parents have a 
choice whether to send their kids to various schools, private religious just 
one option among them.25  The Court has mostly backed away from an 
earlier view that we should see religion as distinctive and disallow funding 
that benefits private religious education.  Note, though, that state funds may 
not be earmarked for teaching religion as such; that would violate the 
Establishment Clause just as teaching religious doctrine in public schools 
would.  Also, doctrine still allows some “play in the joints,” i.e., still allows 
the state to sometimes treat religion as distinctive in not including religious 
schooling among other generally available funding, even if the 
Establishment Clause would permit such inclusion.  The key holding is 
Locke v. Davey, 26  permitting Washington to forbid otherwise generally 
available funding for post-secondary education from being used for 
ministerial studies.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion treats religion as 
distinctive, explaining how the framers had a particular concern with public 
funding for religious ministers, with no similar concern about public 
funding for other professions or studies.  The Court distinguished Locke in 
Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer,27 holding that the Free Exercise Clause 
forbids excluding religious institutions from receiving public support for 
building children’s playgrounds; there was no good reason to treat the 
religious recipient as distinctively unworthy of such funds.  How the Court 
will reconcile Locke and Trinity Lutheran is front and center in this Term’s 
Montana v. Espinoza 28  case involving a state constitutional provision 
forbidding public funds for private religious education. 
 
 Fourth, government sponsorship of religious symbols is another area in 
which religion is distinctive.  The Court has refused to adopt one of two 
possible black-letter rules — the state may never sponsor a religious 
symbol, or it always may do so (so long as the symbol doesn’t operate in 
coercive fashion, which will almost never be the case).  Rather, the Court 
                                                 
24 See Aaron Saiger, Deconstitutionalizing Dewey, 13 FIU L. REV. 765, 767-77 (2019).  
For some doctrinal difficulties with this position, see Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of 
Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451 (1995). 
25 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
26 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004). 
27 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). 
28 Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P. 3d 603 (2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 
2777 (U.S. June 28, 2019) (No. 18-1195). 
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has examined nuanced contextual factors to determine whether the state 
appears to be endorsing a preferred religion through the symbol, or whether 
the religiosity of the symbol is better seen as backgrounded against a 
broader secular meaning.  So if a crèche stands alone atop courthouse steps, 
it is unconstitutional; but if it is part of a broader holiday display, it’s okay.29  
If the Ten Commandments are displayed on a courthouse wall, that’s a 
problem; but if they’re part of a monument park on state grounds, that’s 
okay.30  Even a forty foot Latin cross on state land may be constitutional if 
it is best understood as honoring the World War I dead and not as the state 
promoting Christianity.31  None of this contextual examination is needed 
when the state erects a secular symbol, such as the U.S. flag. 
 
 We may deduce one more principle from these religion-as-distinctive 
Establishment Clause areas of law — the state may advance various notions 
of the good, even hotly contested ones, so long as they are secular and not 
expressly those of specific religions or religion in general.32  There is an 
important alternative view here, based in a robust Rawlsian conception of 
public reason, that would bar the state from advancing any comprehensive 
notion of the good, religious or secular.  I’ll return to that — and challenge 
it — in the next section when I discuss how Laborde’s view fits with that 
broader, religion-as-not-distinctive position. 
 
 On the Free Exercise Clause side of the ledger, the easiest rule is that 
the state may not discriminate against particular religions.  The Court was 
unanimous, for example, in spotting such discrimination against a small 
religion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.33  This 
norm is not distinctive to religion, in the following sense — our Equal 
Protection Clause jurisprudence would reach the same result, but it would 
also reach this result for targeted discrimination against a specific race, or 
gender, or sexual orientation.  What counts as invalid state discrimination 
against religion generally has proven to be complex terrain.  Locke/Trinity 
Lutheran/Espinoza explore one aspect of this (denial of otherwise generally 
available funds to religious persons or institutions).34  An easier case was 
                                                 
29 Compare County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), with Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
30 Compare McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), with Van Orden v. Perry, 
545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
31 American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). 
32  For my support for a broad view of secular state speech, see Abner S. Greene, 
Government Endorsement:  A Reply to Nelson Tebbe’s Government Nonendorsement, 98 
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 87 (2013); Abner S. Greene, State Speech and Political 
Liberalism, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 421 (2013); Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on 
Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667 (2001); Abner S. Greene, Government of the 
Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
33 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
34 See supra text accompanying notes 26-28. 
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McDaniel v. Paty,35 invalidating a state constitutional provision forbidding 
religious clergy from running for certain state offices. 
 
 The big action in Free Exercise Clause constitutional and statutory law 
has been the question of exemptions — when, if ever, should religious 
persons or institutions receive an exemption from an otherwise valid law of 
general applicability?  The question can be stated in two steps:  (i)  Does 
the Free Exercise Clause ever require such exemptions (and if so, should 
courts award them as well as legislatures)?  (ii)  If the Free Exercise Clause 
does not require such exemptions (either at all or in particular cases), what 
is the appropriate legislative role in awarding them as a matter of policy 
(often called accommodations), and are there Establishment Clause limits 
on such legislative power?  From 1963-1990, the Court had reached a kind 
of settlement on (i):  The Free Exercise Clause requires an exemption from 
a law that places a substantial burden on religious practice, unless the 
government can satisfy strict scrutiny — i.e., that the law satisfies a 
compelling state interest and that denying an exemption is a narrowly 
tailored means of achieving that interest.  This was a period during which 
the Court treated burdens on religious practice as distinctive.  The Court 
ruled against the state in four unemployment insurance cases applying this 
test, where claimants had been denied such insurance after refusing work 
on religious grounds.36  And the Court ruled against the state in one other 
case applying this test, Wisconsin v. Yoder, allowing the Amish to pull 
fourteen and fifteen year old children out of any schooling, public or private, 
contra state law requiring otherwise.37  Otherwise the Court ruled for the 
government, and perhaps it’s best to see the practice over these years as 
applying elevated but not really strict scrutiny; nonetheless, burdens on 
religious practice were treated with special judicial attention.  But in 1990 
the Court shifted gears and held in Employment Division v. Smith38 that even 
when laws of general applicability place substantial burdens on religious 
practice, only rational basis scrutiny is required.  The concerns were of two 
sorts — one, that it’s too hard for courts to balance state interest versus 
religious interest on a case by case basis; two, that requiring exemptions for 
religious claimants (even after a balancing test) would lead to a kind of 
anarchy.  These concerns aren’t specific to religion (the Court wouldn’t 
                                                 
35 435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
36 See Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 
707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  Some argue that these are not best 
seen as exemptions cases, but rather as holdings preventing states from discriminating 
against religious reasons for not working.  See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence 
G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:  The Constitutional Basis for Protecting 
Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1277-82 (1994). 
37 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
38 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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have required exemptions for nonreligious persons either); but the Court’s 
refusal to see harm to religious practice as requiring special treatment was 
a significant step away from the religion-as-distinctive approach. 
 
 And thus, we turn to step (ii):  In the aftermath of Smith, Congress and 
several state governments enacted laws requiring courts to award 
exemptions to religious claimants substantially burdened by laws of general 
applicability, unless the government can persuade the court that uniform 
application of the law is needed to achieve a compelling state interest.  In 
City of Boerne v. Flores,39 the Court declared the federal version of such a 
law — the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) 40  — 
unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments, but RFRA 
remains good law restricting the federal government.  The federal RFRA, 
and state versions, are religion-as-distinctive laws — under them, 
substantial burdens on religious practice deserve amelioration in a way 
unmatched by similar burdens on nonreligious practice.  The Court has so 
far been receptive to this approach; 41  in particular, any Establishment 
Clause objection to such distinctive exemptions for religion has not proven 
problematic.  Partly this is because courts are still working through a 
complex issue — to what extent does the Establishment Clause require 
accounting for harm to third parties in balancing state interest against the 
interest of a religious exemption claimant (assuming the strict scrutiny 
inquiries about compelling state interest and narrow tailoring invite a kind 
of judicial balancing)?42 
 
 Not long after the Court decided Smith, I criticized that decision, 
trumpeting the religion-as-distinctive settlement that had been in place.43  
My Free Exercise Clause argument was of a political participation 
legitimacy sort — if we exclude religious claims as express, predominant, 
justification for law, then we owe something to religious people (one cannot 
be fully bound by law where the lawmaking process excludes some of what 
one believes to be true), and a scheme of exemptions (with proper 
balancing) follows.44  A softer version of my ‘compensation’ argument can 
                                                 
39 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-4. 
41 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  See also Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015) and Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (construing related statute). 
42 See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
43 See Greene, Political Balance, supra note 7. 
44 For some of my responses to objections, see id. at 1636-39.  Laborde objects to my 
political balance argument in two ways:  She reiterates her LE, disaggregation approach, 
separating why we might sometimes protect religious practice from why we might 
sometimes exclude it from backing lawmaking; and she rejects “the view that people 
should be compensated for the illegitimacy of some of the arguments they might present 
when acting in official capacity.”  (p. 304 n.90)  My baseline differs from hers — mine is 
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be made — we have struck a good political balance of keeping religion out 
of politics and politics out of religion (or should be doing so, with various 
adjustments and balancings).  A deep constitutional commitment to 
religious freedom requires a robust governmental sector free from sectarian 
doctrinal religious claims and an accompanying robust protection for people 
to live by their religious faiths to the greatest extent possible with the equal 
freedom of others.  This is an argument for a distinctive role for religious 
exemptions, which doesn’t have a counterpart for nonreligious claims 
because we permit nonreligious arguments to be the express, predominant, 
justification for law, we permit the state to lead students in secular recitation 
and teach core secular values in public schools, and we permit the state 
symbolically to advance the truth of nonreligious positions, such as by 
flying the American flag. 
 
2.  How Laborde’s “disaggregating religion” approach fits and doesn’t fit 
with the religion as distinctive approach 
 
 Recall Laborde’s central LE claim:  “religion is not uniquely special:  
whatever treatment it receives from the law, it receives in virtue of features 
that it shares with nonreligious beliefs, conceptions, and identities.”  (p. 3)  
Everything she says about what the state may not do (nonestablishment) and 
what it must do (free exercise exemptions) she says through the prism of 
her claim that liberalism’s religion is not about what makes religion 
distinctive, but rather about what makes religion like other things.  In the 
preceding section, I argued from a normative and descriptive perspective 
that this approach is misguided, that liberal (and constitutional) theory can 
and should treat religion as distinctive.  I now set forth several ways in 
which Laborde’s religion-as-not-distinctive approach conflicts with what I 
have claimed is the better view, and a few ways in which Laborde and I 
share common ground. 
 
                                                 
that all citizens have an equal right (through their legislators) to speak their truth in the 
lawmaking process; a partial gag rule on such speech creates a legitimacy problem for the 
resulting law that purports to bind all, including those whose arguments were excluded 
from being the express, predominant, justification for law.  That there might be a good 
reason for the partial gag rule (on which Laborde and I agree) does not make this legitimacy 
problem go away. 
 In other words, we should distinguish two types of argument we might exclude from 
being the express, predominant ground for lawmaking.  We have reached a justifiable 
settlement to exclude certain such grounds — e.g., racism or sexism.  This is a kind of 
viewpoint exclusion for lawmaking.  When we exclude a sectarian theistic claim from 
grounding lawmaking it isn’t because we have determined the viewpoint contained therein 
is wrong or otherwise unjustifiable.  Rather, the state should take no position on contested 
religious truth claims, and similarly such claims should not be the express, predominant 
ground for generally binding law — such reliance on an extrahuman source of normative 
authority improperly excludes nonbelievers from the lawmaking process.  But this does not 
mean the religious viewpoint asserted for lawmaking is illegitimate in the way a racist or 
sexist viewpoint is. 
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 First, regarding nonestablishment.  Laborde’s three principles are that 
the state should base coercive laws on accessible reasons, that the state 
should not endorse social identities when the upshot would be to harm 
vulnerable minority groups, and that the state should not base coercive law 
on comprehensive ethics, i.e., notions of the good.  She means all of these 
principles to include religion as an example of the problem, but, since she 
has disaggregated religion into (what she claims are) its features, her claims 
at each turn are broader.  I share her concern about accessibility but would 
limit its application in a way she does not; I mostly agree with her about 
state nonendorsement of powerful over vulnerable groups; and I mostly 
disagree with the concern about basing law on comprehensive notions of 
the good.  The normative and descriptive theory I sketched in the prior 
section requires a powerful but narrow set of limits on state action regarding 
nonestablishment. 
 
 Laborde bases her theory of accessible reasons backing coercive law on 
a principle of democratic political participation, and, I would add, 
democratic legitimacy (and Laborde calls this principle “the justifiable 
state” (p. 117)).  In the liberal state, legislators are representatives of and 
fiduciaries for the sovereign citizens; the currency of legislative deliberation 
should be based in reasons and justifications that all citizens, as citizens 
(rather than as, say, members of the dominant religious group), can follow 
and appreciate.  This is properly seen as a burden on lawmakers; citizens as 
such may debate each other based on any kind of reason.  Basing coercive 
legislation on express, predominant, reference to an extrahuman source of 
normative authority — the majority’s understanding of God’s will — 
renders the resulting legislation illegitimate as to those who don’t share the 
relevant religious faith, because they (through legislators who would be able 
to speak for them) lack access to the justificatory grounding for the law.  
Laborde refers to this use of Rawlsian public reason theory as a “thin 
epistemic filter” (p. 119), and that seems right.  As part of her LE, 
disaggregating religion approach, Laborde claims that “religious views … 
are not uniquely special from the point of view of accessibility.”  (p. 125)  
Her examples are “personal testimony” and “personal experience.”  (pp. 
125-26).  But these are unlikely candidates for the type of 
reason/justification that could expressly and predominantly capture a 
legislative body and lead to coercive law.  It seems like a way of saying 
‘see, religion really isn’t distinctive, we can be LEs here!’  It distracts from 
the core animating concern about inaccessible reasons backing legislative 
action — religious ones.  Moreover, the disaggregation approach fails to 
grapple with what religious people hold nearest and dearest to their hearts, 
minds, and souls — their faith in and relationship to an extrahuman source 
of normative authority, i.e., to God.  The point isn’t that religious reference 
is always obscure or not based in reason; this is a complex issue, because 
for some religious people, God’s-will-based arguments are no less based in 
reason than are other arguments.  The point is that the source of authority is 
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outside the state’s legal apparatus — the framers of the Constitution and 
laws or those documents — and instead based in the eternal omnipotent 
framer and draftsperson, as it were.  There is a unique problem with basing 
law on that kind of referent, and acknowledging that uniqueness allows us 
to focus on distinctive ways in which the liberal state should treat religious 
belief — regarding both limitations on and exemptions from lawmaking. 
 
 Laborde’s second nonestablishment principle is about the “inclusive 
state” (p. 132); it rejects government speech that would exalt some social 
identities over others.  Although this notion of nonendorsement is closely 
tied to the similar idea Justice O’Connor developed in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence,45 Laborde follows Eisgruber and Sager (and other scholars 
such as Nelson Tebbe),46 in applying this norm to any social identity that 
“is a marker of vulnerability and domination,” which could include “race, 
… culture or ethnic identity.”  (p. 137)  A cultural-specific, context-
dependent, objective inquiry is needed to determine where and how state 
speech runs afoul of this norm.  As a matter of proper liberal democratic 
theory — focusing on equal liberty — and of U.S. constitutional law, the 
extension of this norm beyond religion seems appropriate.  Our Equal 
Protection Clause is properly understood as blocking symbolic state action 
that disparages persons on the basis of religion, race, or similar dominant-
over-vulnerable social markers.  Religion should not be seen as distinctive 
on this score, and we can ground the norm solely in the Equal Protection 
Clause.  So, a state’s placing a crèche atop its courthouse steps, or placing 
a symbol of white nationalism in the same spot, are equally unconstitutional 
examples of government speech (although I don’t mean to claim they have 
equal moral status; the former is a symbol to be welcomed when placed by 
private persons or churches on their own property; the latter is a symbol to 
be condemned even when placed by private persons on private property, 
though, under U.S. free speech law, with some exceptions, it is permitted). 
 
 Laborde’s third nonestablishment principle — “the limited state” (p. 
143) — forbids state coercive action based on a “comprehensive conception 
of the good,” religious or otherwise.  (p. 145)  This Rawlsian idea, 
previewed in Laborde’s analysis of Quong’s work, highlights the libertarian 
aspect of liberalism, in the following sense:  it “prioritizes individual rights 
of self-determination in ethical matters.”  (p. 144)  As a threshold question 
of proper grounds for state action, this principle is overly restrictive.  Say 
the majority in a legislature are vitalists and believe that state action should 
be predicated on preserving human life about all else.  Or say they are 
staunchly committed to environmental stewardship, and believe that all 
state action should start from that premise.47  One can imagine many other 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
46 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 5; Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 
98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 658-65 (2013). 
47 See Greene, supra note 16, at 1520-21. 
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examples, including majorities that are in the grips of a particular political 
and/or economic theorist (Karl Marx?  Adam Smith?  Milton Friedman?  
etc.)  A state may have a comprehensive view about the good (Laborde uses 
ethics and the good interchangeably here) rather than a piecemeal view 
about the good, and as a step one, threshold, presumptive matter of proper 
grounding for state action, there is nothing about liberalism that prevents 
the state from acting according to one or another comprehensive view, such 
as the examples I have mentioned.  Whether a proper constitution in a liberal 
democracy should contain rights that trump state action (and the content of 
such rights) is a separate, second step question.  Some state-backed 
comprehensive notions of the good may never infringe constitutional rights; 
some may do so all of the time; and some may do so on a case by case basis.  
Thus, my response to Laborde’s religion-is-not-distinctive approach here is 
twofold:  First, even lumping religion with other comprehensive notions of 
the good, the “limited state” principle is too limited.  Second, we should 
treat religion as distinctive regarding proper grounds for coercive law, but 
that requires cycling back to principle one, regarding the justifiable state 
and accessibility. 
 
 Regarding exemptions, Laborde and I share a commitment to a fairly 
robust scheme that would require multi-factor, case by case, balancing.48  I 
have developed two separate arguments for such a scheme — one that is 
internal to U.S. constitutional religion clause jurisprudence; the other that is 
not distinctive to religion, but based in a different theoretical predicate for 
why robust exemptions are appropriate for a liberal democracy.  Regarding 
the former, as I have explained above, because the state is precluded from 
basing law on express, predominant, religious justification, from teaching 
the truth of a religion in public school (or more generally), from leading 
public school students in religious prayer, and from using its speech power 
to endorse a favored religion, it is also proper to let religious people out 
from under the clutches of law that substantially burdens their religious 
practice, that puts them in a deep conflict between the state and God.  This 
is a strong public-private line settlement, one that we have come close to 
achieving at times in our constitutional (and statutory) jurisprudence.  The 
case for exemptions here is distinctive to religion.  I turn to the case for 
exemptions more broadly in the next section. 
 
B.  An Alternative Predicate for Exemptions 
 
                                                 
48 A certain subset of exemptions problems poses a particularly difficult challenge for me, 
namely, those that pit certain equality claims — say, to reproductive freedom or to LGBTQ 
rights — against claims for religious exemption.  Laborde acknowledges that in many of 
these types of case, the religious person is not making a morally abhorrent claim, but rather 
a morally ambivalent one, and thus a balancing test is needed.  (pp. 225-27)  How we 
should conduct such a balancing test is one of the issues in a work-in-progress of mine, 
tentatively called “The Dilemma of Liberal Pluralism.” 
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 Although it appears in chapter 5, Laborde’s case for the legitimacy of 
the liberal state’s coercive authority, for its justifiable “competence to 
adjudicate jurisdictional boundary questions” (p. 162), is a predicate for the 
book.  She contends that we are faced with “circumstances of reasonable 
disagreement” (p. 168), and only the state has the legitimacy to impose and 
enforce solutions.  Laborde’s argument in this section is telescoped, and she 
does not claim to be setting forth the full case.  Furthermore, her argument 
for state sovereignty isn’t necessary for the central claim in the book, about 
why and how we should disaggregate religion and how that should play out 
for nonestablishment and free exercise.  Nonetheless, her case for the 
legitimacy of the sovereign liberal democratic state is part of her overall 
framework. 
 
 The case, as a wholesale matter, is faulty, and its flaws can point us to a 
broad argument for exemptions, beyond religion.  Assuming the 
correlativity of arguments for political obligation and legitimacy,49 note that 
Laborde does not rely on arguments from consent (express or implied) or 
duty of fair play; nor does she rely on arguments from a natural duty to obey 
just institutions or from associative obligation (what we owe each other as 
fellow citizens). 50   Her position, rather, is a blend of arguments from 
democratic political participation and the need for systemic settlement.  The 
former may be a necessary condition for political obligation and legitimacy, 
but it is not a sufficient condition.51  Whatever mechanism is established for 
majority rule, individuals don’t knowingly and voluntarily cede self-
government (we are born into a society and rarely have the opportunity to 
swear an oath to abide by majoritarian outcomes, and even such an oath 
would be problematic if we lack sufficient alternatives).  Minority groups 
(of all sorts) are often not properly heard, and their interests are 
insufficiently considered.  Moreover, the problem of the dead hand is real 
— constitutions and laws purport to govern indefinitely, covering people 
who have not had an opportunity to participate in their making, and the 
realities of political economy make change cumbersome.  Laborde’s 
argument, thus, necessarily turns on there being some minimal democratic 
bona fides plus the need for a diverse complex society to settle various 
matters on which people disagree. 
 
 Arguments for a moral duty to obey the state’s laws (and correlative 
arguments for the state’s claims of legitimate authority) are meant to be 
general, to obligate and justify all state claims of authority.52  These claims 
                                                 
49 See GREENE, supra note 9, at 24-34.  My arguments in this section are drawn from 
chapters 1 and 2 of AGAINST OBLIGATION. 
50 For the case that none of these arguments properly grounds political obligation or 
legitimacy, see id. at 35-45, 56-94. 
51 See id. at 45-56. 
52 See id. at 15-17. 
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may be subject to override in individual instances, but the question up front 
is whether the general case for obligation and legitimacy can be made.  The 
type of general settlement argument Laborde offers is subject to several 
objections.53  One:  The argument suffers from some of the same flaws from 
which consent and democratic participation arguments suffer:  Who among 
us has consented to the political system into which we are born and then 
live?  If individual notions of right — maybe we could call this conscience 
— are part of what make each of us human and are not displaceable by 
superior numbers and concretization over time, then “settlement” is just a 
word for describing the ruling group’s assertion of authority.  Two:  The 
argument from settlement does not properly account for subgroups within a 
polity; their core contention is that the state’s ground of authority is not 
valid as a trumping source just because a majority of the citizens has 
established it; other sources of authority may exist, and although the state 
may properly prevail in some instances, it can’t properly claim general valid 
authority.  This is a version of a core argument for political pluralism.  
Three:  Error costs exist in all directions.  Although in many cases the state 
may make correct (or at least best) decisions to settle reasonable 
disagreement, in others it may not; perhaps other persons, maybe through 
non-state groups, can reach correct (or at least better) answers to complex 
problems.  The state’s general claim to authority is too broad.  Four:  To the 
extent settlement arguments rely on Burkean common law notions of 
true/best answers working themselves out over time, they are subject to 
rejoinders that powerful majority interests may control over time in a way 
that does not properly obligate those out of power (with a correlative hit to 
the state’s legitimacy claim) and that accretion over time may represent 
mistakes building on mistakes and becoming blind to error. 
 
 The general case for political obligation and legitimacy — whether from 
the virtues of settlement or on other grounds — cannot be sustained.  Partly 
that is because of the flaws in the various grounds, and partly that is because 
of the strength of the case for robust political pluralism, i.e., for permeable 
sovereignty.54  We should treat all comprehensive views of the good as 
                                                 
53 See id. at 94-113. 
54 See id. at 20-24.  Jean Cohen refers to my work (and the work of others) as advancing a 
kind of jurisdictional political pluralism.  See Jean L. Cohen, On Liberalism’s Religion, 23 
CRITICAL REV. OF INT’L SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHIL. 48, 12-14 (2020) [I need correct 
pagination]; Jean L. Cohen, Sovereignty, the Corporate Religious, and 
Jurisdictional/Political Pluralism, in CÉCILE LABORDE & AURELIA BARDON, EDS., 
RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 83 (2017).  She offers several critiques of 
this position, which I will address in future work.  Regarding Laborde’s defense of the 
legitimacy of the sovereign democratic state, a view Cohen shares, see On Liberalism’s 
Religion at 10-11, Cohen notes the seriousness of the challenge from jurisdictional political 
pluralists, and cautions that “we need more from Laborde on the jurisdictional question, 
because I doubt it will go away and I fear that those who do not accept the core intuition 
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presumptively on equal footing.  The state’s claim to authority is no more 
justifiable than, say, a claim based in religious, tribal, or cultural norms.  But 
the liberal democratic state has a monopoly on armies and police and 
prisons, and so it is subject to a distinctive justificatory burden.  Since it 
cannot carry that burden as a general matter, it must instead justify each law 
and each application of law.  Those who follow different sources of 
normative authority — religious people but others too — thus have two 
related grounds for complaint about the state’s claim of authority just 
because it is the state:  the general case for political obligation and 
legitimacy fails, and pluralism rather than state-monism is the better 
approach to a world of plural claimed sources of normative authority.  A 
robust system of exemptions can serve as a kind of “partial exit”;;55 although 
they don’t let people who follow non-state sources of authority live purely 
on their own, they do achieve some amelioration.  Such a system requires 
balancing, but the burden is on the state and not on the individual or group 
claimant. 
 
 This case for exemptions is not distinctive to religion and is not meant 
as an interpretation of U.S. constitutional doctrine.  As a matter of ideal 
political theory, it can complement the more localized case for religious 
exemptions based in the balance we have struck between a robust 
Establishment Clause and a Free Exercise Clause that takes seriously the hit 
to religious people not just from discrimination but also from substantial 
burdens from nondiscriminatory laws.  (This is how that clause should 
work, does work as filtered through federal and state RFRAs, and could 
work were the Court to overrule Smith.)  This more general case for 
exemptions, not distinctive to religion, overlaps partly with Laborde’s case.  
Both of us would apply a balancing test to alleviate some burdens on 
persons whose commitments conflict with state law.  The main difference 
between our approaches is the grounding for the claim against the state, for 
the claim that even nondiscriminatory laws of general applicability must 
sometimes (as a matter of right) give way.  Laborde maintains that “the state 
should generally refrain from infringing integrity-related liberties” (p. 203); 
this is meant to protect “the values of identity, autonomy, moral agency, and 
self-respect.”  (p. 204)  My argument is focused instead on competing 
sources of normative authority from comprehensive views of the good.  A 
constitution with a capacious view of individual rights might cover some of 
what Laborde wants to include in her argument for exemptions, but protect 
them from laws that intentionally or directly infringe the rights in question, 
rather than as incidental burdens from otherwise valid laws of general 
applicability.  If we are focused, though, on exemptions (as Laborde is), 
then we do better by approaching the matter from principles of political 
                                                 
behind the notion of liberal democratic state sovereignty (the primacy of civil law) are quite 
serious about their projects.”  Indeed. 
55 See GREENE, supra note 9, at 114-15; Greene, Kiryas Joel, supra note 20, at 8-57. 
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pluralism, pitting competing comprehensive views of normative authority 




 The dawn of the liberal democratic state marked a new-found tolerance 
for persons to practice religion in various forms.  Yet, finding the 
appropriate sweet spot for religion’s role in the state and how state action 
may affect the lives of religious people continues to be elusive.  Cécile 
Laborde’s ambitious book Liberalism’s Religion comes down firmly on the 
side of seeing religion as not distinctive, even in a liberal democracy.  To 
the extent that nonestablishment and free exercise norms should prevail, 
they should prevail insofar as we can disaggregate religion into components 
that it shares with nonreligious belief and practice.  In this review essay, I 
have advanced a position on which Laborde spends little time in her book 
— religion is distinctive because for religious people, God is at the center 
of their beliefs and practices, and there’s nothing else like it.  In so doing, I 
have suggested that there are good reasons for liberal democracy generally 
and the U.S. constitutional order specifically to respond to this sociological 
fact with nonestablishment and free exercise norms that are distinctive to 
religious belief and practice.  Liberalism’s religion need not be 
disaggregative; it can remain true to core liberal principles while taking 
seriously the role that God plays in the lives of the devout. 
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